Effect of Performance Corporate Governance Mechanisms to Change the CEO in Companies
Abstract
According to the agency theory and the separation of ownership from management, including the most important measures of a company is management changes. On the other hand the cause of change the executive’s managers because their effectiveness should be a special place in accounting research. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the performance impact and mechanisms of corporate governance on likely to change the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). To this end, 65 companies from the population, the information required for the 9-year period of the study (2008-2017) available in case they were selected. According to previous research, a measure of Return On Equity (ROE) and criteria for evaluating the performance of an entity, majority ownership, independence of board members, CEO positioning and public and private property for corporate governance was considered. To test the hypotheses, methods, and logistic regression with Eviews software were analyzed using descriptive statistics. The results show that the variables of institutional ownership and independence of board members and the CEO have a negative impact on the relationship between performance, but the majority ownership has a positive effect causing the change of CEO is more sensitive to performance. The variable of director representing the majority shareholder in the company which is the majority shareholder representative, managing director has a significant negative relationship between performance and the CEO. The type of ownership (Private or government) has a significant negative impact on the relationship between performance and the CEO and the negative effects of private ownership is more than public ownership.
Keywords:
Corporate governance mechanisms, Managing director, Performance, State ownership, Private propertyReferences
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